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The primary aim of this paper is to test alternative explanations 
of earnings in Yugoslav firms, with reduced form wage equations being 
estimated in the absence and presence of capital rationing. The two 
capital supply regimes are distinguished so that we can discern between 
the competing contentions in the Yugoslav literature that earnings dif­
ferentials are the result of disturbances and imperfections which are 
transmitted by the system of self-management per se or are a direct con­
sequence of capital rationing by the authorities. In estimating the wage 
equations on Yugoslav data, we can therefore offer preliminary evidence 
on whether income dispersion is a systemic problem in a labor-managed 
economy because of the weakness of labor market forces or is merely a 
consequence of capital rationing by the authorities.
Although the growing theoretical literature on labor-managed firms 
[see Vanek (1970), Ireland and Law (1982)] has strong implications about 
the determination of earnings, empirical studies of earnings rely on re­
latively ad hoc formulations of the estimating equations [see Wachtel 
(1972), Vanek and Jovicic (1975), Estrin, Svejnar and Mow (1983)]. This is 
a particularly serious deficiency in the Yugoslav context where inter-firm 
wage differentials are sufficiently large to suggest that income determina­
tion could be a fundamental policy issue [see Estrin (1981) and (1983)].
Most labor management models assume that workers' earnings are endog­
enous. From this perspective, any factors which cause profit differences 
under capitalism must generate inter-firm wage inequalities under labor- 




























































































This is essentially the argument of a group of economists within and out­
side Yugoslavia, henceforth called the "labor school", who view inter-firm 
differences in demand and cost conditions as the primary source of Yugoslav 
income differentials.2 Against them, the bulk of institutionalists and 
policy makers in Yugoslavia regard capital rationing as the main cause of 
the problem. This "capital school" stresses the scarcity of capital in 
Yugoslavia and the inefficiency of its rationing with the price being 
fixed well below the market clearing rate.3 The enterprise capital stock, 
itself the consequence of previous planning decisions, is seen as gener­
ating implicit rentals (comprising the difference between the capital's 
marginal product and cost) which are distributed to the workers as incomes. 
Policy conclusions highlight the distinction between the two schools : 
labor school analysts are concerned with competitive pressures, enterprise 
entry and exit and anti-trust policies while members of the capital school 
stress capital pricing and allocation according to scarcity.
2. EXPLANATIONS OF EARNINGS
In this section we examine the.factors influencing the determination 
of incomes in Yugoslavia. Our assumptions approximately conform to those 
underlying the labor and capital schools, and capital rationing can be 
incorporated into the general estimating equation as a special institu­
tional feature which allows us to nest the two hypotheses in a single 
estimating equation.
Commencing with the standard model of enterprise choice under labor 
management, let PQ denote revenue, rK capital costs and H other fixed 




























































































y = PQ - rK - H L (1)
with respect to the choice variables L and K , while output price P , 
capital payments r and fixed costs H are assumed to be exogenous. The 
maximization leads to the reduced form input demand equations :
Ld = Ld (P,r,H) 
Kd = Kd (P,r,H)
( 2 )
which are homogeneous of degree zero in P, r and H. Labor income is a 
choice variable, and therefore cannot enter the input demand functions 
conventionally but (1) and (2) can be combined to express y as an indirect 
function of the exogenous variables,
PQ [Ld (P,r,H) , Kd (P,r,H)]~ rKd (P,r,H) - H 
Ld (P , r , H)
= y(p,r,H).
(3)
Excess'supply of labor in the social sector guarantees that Yugoslav em­
ployment is indeed demand determined. Therefore, traditional labor manage­
ment theory implies that incomes are a function of prices, capital costs, 
fixed costs and measures of efficiency implicit in the production function. 
From this standpoint appropriate policies to reduce Yugoslav income dif­
ferentials include measures to improve labor mobility and enterprise entry 
and exit in order to reduce price variance and cost differences among labor- 
managed firms.
The capital school theorists offer an alternative explanation of 



























































































an implicit rental from the capital allocated to their firms by planners.
In the best known formalization of this view, Vanek and Jovicic (1975) 
hypothesize that
y - a + e£ (4)
where a and 3 are parameters. Equation (4) can be interpreted as a be­
havioral relationship between incomes, the marginal product of labor (a)
8Kand the imputed capital rental per head, —  , the latter comprising the 
difference between the marginal product of capital (3) and its cost (com­
monly assumed to be zero in this framework). The short-term policy implica­
tions of this model are clear; provided that the marginal product of labor 
and capital do not vary across firms, the entire dispersion in Yugoslav 
incomes can be eliminated by charging for capital at its scarcity price, 3- 
In the longer term, one would seek to eliminate the problem altogether by 
the appropriate reallocation of capital.
Two streams of applied work on Yugoslav wage determination have been 
developed in the literature, based on various specifications of equations 
(3) and (4), respectively [see Wachtel (1973), Estrin (1979), Rivera-Batiz 
(1980), and Staellerts (1982)]. Each appears to be internally consistent 
and to offer valid representations of the process generating wages in 
Yugoslavia. However, the explanations offered are mutually inconsistent, 
one being derived from a capital market clearing assumption and the other 
from capital rationing. As a result, they cannot be compared empirically 
since the hypotheses involved are not nested.
Our approach therefore is to use a general estimating framework, into 




























































































cases. Starting with the capital school equation (4), the labor school 
would object that, even if incomes were affected by capital rationing, 
dispersion in demand and cost factors under labor management would gener­
ate differences in the labor marginal products, a, and would be reflected 
in the determination of optimal employment, L̂ . Hence one must drop the 
constant term, a, and employ the labor demand equation (2) derived from 
the enterprise optimization problem in determining the desired capital- 
labor ratio. If the capital stock is rationed at K,
Kd = K (5)
substituting (2) and (5) into equation (4) yields the general specifica­
tion
y = Y (p ,r,H, K) . (6)
Both the labor and capital schools are nested in equation (6) according 
to the significance of the coefficients on K and on p,H and r:, respec­
tively. The two explanations can therefore be tested in a common frame­
work.
Following Lewis (1963) and Svejnar (1981), we use a logarithmic 
approximation to the income equation (6) :
£ny.it d . + d 5 . n P .  + d InX. + d în r. + d £n K. . (7)01 l it 2 it 3 it i* it
The variables are a vector capturing inter-industry difference in





























































































The logarithmic approximation embeds the views of the two schools 
as follows. Using the standard capital school assumption of fixed coef­
ficients (Leontieff-type) technology Ce.g. Vanek and Jovicic (1975)], the 
capital school view in logarithmic form can be expressed as
Zn y. = d'. + d' inK.^it 01 k it (7')
Equation (7') is nested in equation (7) according to the joint signifi­
cance of coefficients d1 , d2 and dJ.'4 Similarly, re-solving the opti­
mization problem in logarithmic form on the assumption of capital market 
clearing yields a labor school' equation
In it d". + d" In P. + 01 1 it d" £n X. + d" Zn r.2 it 3 it (7")
which is also a special case of equation (7). We cannot reject the labor 
school hypothesis if d^ * 0 and d , d^ and d3 are jointly significant. 
To test the capital school view we estimate equations (7) and (7') and 
use an F-test to determine the joint significance of dj , d2 and d3 in 
equation (7). To test the labor school view we employ a t-test on the 
significance of d^ in equation (7).
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The earnings equations (7) and (7') are estimated on annual data for 
19 Yugoslav industries and the period 1965-1972, the era of maximal self 
management.5 The data are derived from Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavie, 
with the price series being derived from the series of nominal and real 




























































































rate standing as proxy for r. The vector is intended to capture
inter-industry dispersion in technological and cost conditions, including H,
and in this study it is proxied by minimum efficient scale, denoted AVsize,
the relatively restrictive technical conditions for production under labor 
management which necessitated the inclusion of H in the original optimiza­
tion problem [see Svejnar (1982) and Ireland and Law (1982)]. It is measured 
by average firm size in the industry.
The role of technical efficiency in profit functions and therefore 
income functions under labor management is clear but the fact that labor 
productivity is an endogenous variable in both the labor and capital school 
views is a potential source of simultaneous equation bias. To deal with 
this problem, we employ the form of instrumental variable estimation pro­
posed by Brundy and Jorgenson (1971) and also followed by Estrin (1979) 
in his estimation of labor school wage equations. Specifically, the ap­
proach entails estimating a labor productivity equation derived from the 
relevant model and entering the residuals into the earnings equation to 
eliminate the simultaneity between productivity and the other determinants 
of earnings in the earnings equation. For example, for the general for­
mulation of equation (7), the procedure involves estimating
and labor productivity, denoted y- . AVsize is included to take account of
*■ (?) - a . + b Un P . 01 i 1 + b2 Jin r^t + b^Jln AVsize + b^&nK^ + (8)
and placing the residuals in the earnings equation instead of labor produc­
tivity,





























































































where (k ̂  is Che error in the earnings equation. The procedure gives 
unbiased estimates of the earnings though not the labor productivity 
equation provided the errors in the former (£^t) ate uncorrelated with 
the errors in the latter
With only 8 observations per industry, it is impossible to employ 
the most efficient estimation procedure for this problem, Zellner's (1962) 
seemingly unrelated regressions framework, which would generate industry 
specific wage equations. To approximate this, we employ ordinary least 
squares with industry specific dummies seperately on each of the two equa­
tions - productivity and wages. In order to approximate the covariance 
model for this cross section time series data set, we include a second degree 
time polynomial in the wage equations. This can be viewed as proxying for 
the increasingly egalitarian trend in the earnings dispersion over the 
period [see Estrin (1981)].
In Table 1 we report the estimate of equation (7) [formulated as (9)]
on the-Yugoslav data set. The regression displays a very good overall fit 
— 2with an R = 0.92 and all the estimated coefficients being significant 
and displaying the predicted signs. Incomes vary positively with the 
product price, productive efficiency and average 'firm size, and the effect 
of the interest rate is negative. The time variables are significant and 
indicate that, ceteris paribus, earnings were growing at a decreasing rate 
between 1965 and 1972, almost certainly the consequence of government policy.6 
The nineteen industry specific intercepts which are not reported in the 
table reveal that considerable differences exist among the individual in­
dustries. The overall significance of the equation at the 99 % level offers 





























































































As we stressed at the outset, the main aim of this paper is hypoth­
esis testing to establish the empirical validity of the labor and capital 
schools. The significance of the coefficient on the capital stock leads 
us to reject a strict labor school hypothesis which would claim that 
incomes are not affected by capital rationing (i.e. contrary to this view 
we find d^ >0). Similarly, an F-test on the joint significance of the 
coefficients on price, interest rate and the technological variables finds 
these coefficients jointly significant (i.e. we do not find d. = d£ = d3 
= 0). The test thus leads us to reject the capital school hypothesis 
which places exclusive emphasis on the rationed stock of capital as a 
determinant of incomes. We therefore find support for a more general 
formulation of wage determination in which both labor and capital school 
views are relevant.
The natural next question concerns the relative quantitative impor­
tance of the two explanations. We therefore calculate the fraction of 
total earnings that can be attributed to capital rationing with the 
proportion being reported in the first column of Table 2. The proportion
• ^  ^  A  Ais calculated as d̂  £n K / Jin y and, ignoring the covariance of d^ with
other coefficients [see Chiswick and Mincer (1972)], it gives an approxima­
tion of the true effect of capital on income.7 On average, the size of 
the capital rationing effect is very large, accounting for 30 % to 59 % 
of sectoral incomes over the period. However, the inter-industry varia­
tion in this effect around its mean of 48.3% is rather small, with only 
one observation exceeding 55% and two observations falling below 41 %.
It is particularly striking that these estimates actually exceed those 




























































































Using only cross-section data and imposing a narrow interpretation 
of the capital school hypothesis [see Estrin, Svejnar and Mow (1983)], they 
calculate the capital rationing effect to vary between 5 % and 45 % of 
observed earnings in each sector. Hence using a less restrictive version 
of the capital school view we find both a role for labor school factors and 
a relatively greater impact of capital rationing on Yugoslav incomes. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that there is no significant relation­
ship between the proportion of earnings explained by the capital rationing 
effect in each sector and the absolute level of incomes, displayed in 
column (2) of Table 2.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we estimate an econometric model of wage determination 
in Yugoslavia into which the competing hypotheses of the "labor" and 
"capital" schools are nested. The results accord closely to a common sense 
interpretation of the post-reform period. Contrary to the predictions of 
many Yugoslav policy-makers and to the empirical findings of, for example, 
Vanek and Jovicic (1975), we establish that Yugoslav earnings are to some 
extent influenced by the factors suggested in traditional labor-management 
models : dispersion in corporate profitability caused by differences in
demand and cost conditions and passed on to worker earnings via the insti­
tutional arrangements inherent in self-management. This suggests that, as 
Ward (1958) and Meade (1972) have implied, disturbances in the system 
under labor-management are reflected in labor incomes, and that labor and 
product market immobilities in Yugoslavia were sufficiently marked to pre­



























































































over the period. This finding supports the policy prescription of actions 
to stimulate labor mobility and enterprise entry and exit.
But we also find empirical support for view held widely both within 
and outside Yugoslavia that income dispersion is caused by the workers' 
appropriation of monopoly capital rentals derived from the free or cheap 
use of fixed assets. It is clear that, for example, Wachtel (1973) and 
Estrin (1979) were incorrect in choosing to ignore the implications of 
Yugoslav capital rationing and pricing policies for income determination 
between 1965 and 1972. One must therefore also accept the relevance of 
policies based on pricing capital at its scarcity value and ultimately 
eliminating it from dispersion in capital rentals by reallocating fixed 
assets to equalize capital marginal products across uses.
Our econometrics provides evidence in favor of both the capital and 
labor school contentions. The dispute therefore reduces to the empirical 
issue of their relative importance in explaining observed wage differentials 
over the period. In fact, the sum of the effects from labor and product 
market immobilities was the greatest source of earnings dispersion, but 
capital rationing proved to be the largest single source of actual incomes 
at any time. Thus it would seem that after the right to earn income freely 
from the existing fixed assets was devolved to each firm in 1965, wage 
payments were mainly influenced by the firms' initial level of capitaliza­
tion. However, since the capital stock adjusts much more slowly than 
variables such as incomes, productivity andprices, it is not surprising 
that incomes dispersion was primarily determined by the latter variables.
The intuition of Yugoslav experts that the arbitrary arrangements for the 




























































































distribution was basically correct, but the same authorities have also 
tended to underestimate the way that allocative inefficiencies could be 






























































































1This paper is one in a series on Yugoslav wage determination. See also 
Estrin, Svejnar and Mow (1983) for a critical treatment of the traditional 
empirical literature in this field and Estrin and Svejnar (1983) for the 
theoretical modelling underlying our econometrics in this area.
2Economists in this broad tradition include Ward (1958), Meade (1972), 
Wachtel (1972) and particularly Estrin (1979). The results are quite 
general in that they also obtain from other objectives than maximizing 
the income per worker [see Svejnar,(1982)]. This approach is predicated 
on the assumption workers cannot bid entry to high earning co-operatives 
at lower rates of pay, which is illegal in Yugoslavia, and that the real- 
location of resources between users by enterprise entry and exit after 
changes in parameters is minimal. As Estrin (1983) establishes, there was 
very little corporate mobility over the period.
3Principal proponents of this approach include Milenkovitch (1971), Vanek 
(1973), World 3ank (1975), Vanek and Jovicic (1975), and Staellerts (1981) 
It should be stressed that we use the terms labor and capital schools as 
convenient descriptive rather than normative titles.
''See Estrin and Svejnar (1983) for a model generalizing this argument.
5This choice of period is justified in Estrin (1983).
SEstrin (1983) reports that Yugoslav income differentials increased from 
around 1965-1968 and then began to narrow. This was attributed to increas 
ing enterprise entry and the effectiveness of government incomes policies.
7Actual~incomes are employed for the calculations in Table 2, but predicted 
incomes give identical results to the second decimal place.
8 The Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for the two columns in 
Table 3 are - 0.0004 and 0.707 , respectively. Using the entire 152 ob­
servations rather than industry means, the two correlation coefficients 





























































































Instrumental Variables Estimates of Earnings Equation (7)
Jin P 0. 1559 
(0.0275)
Jin r - 0.1107 
(0.0463)















Values in parentheses are standard errors. Variable Ln (Q/L) 






























































































Proportion of the Income
Attributable to Capital Rationing: Calculations Based on
Estimates of Table 1.
(1) (2)
d In K,i* l
lnÿ.l
lny.l
1. Electrical generation & 
distribution 0.59 4.478
2. Coal and Coke 0.51 4.445
3. Petroleum 0.50 4.423
4. Ferrous metallurgy 0.52 4.490
5. Nonferrous minerals 0.51 4.507
6. Nonmetallic minerals 0.45 4.475
7. Metals & metal manufacturing 0.55 4.476
8. Shipbuilding 0.43 4.478
9. Electrical machinery 0.48 4.480
10. Chemicals 0.52 4.491
11. Construction materials 0.48 4.421
12. Wood & wood products 0.49 4.442
13. Paper & paper products 0.48 4.480
14. Textiles & colthing 0.52 4.492
15. Leather & leather products 0.41 4.471
16. Rubber 0.39 4.513
17. Food processing 0.52 4.473
18. Printing & publishing 0.43 4.465
19. Tobacco 0.40 4.452
AVERAGE 0.483 4.471
Calculations based on predicted incomes (d̂  lnk^/lny^) were identi 
cal to the second decimal point to those based on actual incomes. 
The reported values for each industry represents an arithmetic ave 
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